Normative Tensions: European Sanction vs. ASEAN’s Non-Interference in the Case of Myanmar by Robertua, Verdinand
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
Abstrak
Paper ini berusaha menjelaskan relevansi antara kebijakan sanksi Uni Eropa dan kebijakan constructive engagement ASEAN. Teori NPE yang
dikemukakan oleh Ian Manner ini menjadi pisau analisis yang efektif untuk menjelaskan kebijakan sanksi Uni Eropa. Artikel ini akan mengelaborasi
argumentasi Thomas Diez yang menekankan refleksi identitas Uni Eropa sebagai elemen utama teori NPE. Dalam penelitian ini akan dikaji
pembentukan identitas UE yang dihadapkan berlawanan dengan ASEAN. Perubahan yang terjadi Myanmar akhir-akhir ini menjadi dasar bagi UE
untuk menunda sanksi. Ini menjadi pertanyaan yang menarik karena berbagai laporan dari lembaga swadaya masyarakat internasional justru
menunjukkan reformasi yang terjadi di Myanmar lemah dan tidak berkelanjutan. ASEAN muncul menjadi mitra utama Myanmar dalam
demokratisasi dan pembangungan hak asasi manusia di Myanmar.
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Abstract
This article attempted to explain the relevancy of European sanction policy and ASEAN’s constructive engagement on Myanmar. In many case,
normative power Europe theory which is pioneered by Ian Manners, has been an effective tool to explain the EU’s sanction policy. In this article, it
will emphasize Thomas Diez’s postulation of the reflexivity of the EU’s identity as the main aspect of NPE. Consequently, it will elaborate on how
EU’s identity is constructed against ASEAN who adopted constructive engagement. However, recent change in Myanmar has provoked the EU to
postpone their sanction. It is puzzling because many reports from International Non-Government Organizations show that the reform in
Myanmar is weak and unsustainable. ASEAN emerged as important partner for Myanmar in driving democratization and human rights regime
construction in Myanmar.
Kata kunci: Kekuatan Normatif Eropa, Sanksi UE, ASEAN, perjanjian konstruktif, Aung San Suu Kyi
INTRODUCTION
This article wants to highlight current change in the
European Union (EU) foreign policy on Myanmar and
the persistence of ASEAN’s non-interference principle
and assess its theoretical implication. More than 15
years, Myanmar has become the target of sanction
from the United States (US) and the EU due to its
poor performance on human rights and democracy. In
other side, ASEAN, Myanmar´s main trading partner,
availability maintained constructive engagement
strategy with Myanmar. Under Thein Sein´s regime,
Aung San Suu Kyi is released and able to join by-
election in April 2012. She and some NLD members
won seats in parliament. Responding to the progress,
ASEAN urged for western countries to lift out the
sanction and the sanction is being lifted out. However,
hundreds of political prisoners are still in jail and
recently Myanmar army has done oppressive action
toward Katchin ethic. Is Myanmar has done significant
reform on human rights record? If not, what is the
implication for normative power Europe theory?This
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article will be divided into four main parts: back-
ground of Myanmar and EU sanction on Myanmar,
theoretical framework of Normative Power Europe,
Effectiveness of the EU sanction, Construction of
Normative Power Europe and lastly the implication of
EU’s policy to abandon the sanction.
MYANMAR: A BRIEF HISTORY
Myanmar was independent in 1948 and Military
Junta has been in power since 1962. Myanmar army or
Tatmadaw has significant influence in Myanmar regime
and has shaped three form of military regime: first,
Burma Socialist Party (BSPP) under Ne Win leader-
ship in 1962 and second, State Law and Order
Restoration Council (SLORC) commanded by Saw
Maunin 1988 and lastly, State Peace and Development
Council (SPDC) under Than Shwe leadership in
1997.
In 1987, in an effort to combat inflation and black
market, the Burmese government demonetizes (http://
www.petersoninstitute.org/research/topics/sanctions/
myanmar.cfm,2012)
several denominations of bank notes. The action
renders 60-80 percent of money in circulation worth-
less, triggering first protest demonstrations in more
than a decade. Police mismanagement of a minor
incident in Rangoon in March resulted in death of 42
students (Ibid). Pro-democracy demonstrations break
out all over Burma; government responds with brutal
crackdown on demonstrators, imposing curfew in
major cities, detaining hundreds of protestors, closing
universities.
In 1988, pro-democracy activists formed a political
party named The National League for Democracy
(NLD). Aung San Suu Kyi, one of the founders of
NLD, emerged during the crisis as Myanmar’s democ-
racy icon. She is the daughter of Aung San, a pivotal
figure in the Myanmar independence movement in the
1940s. Demonstration reached its peak on 8 August
1988 when 700,000 peoples gathered and took long-
marchin Mandalay and Rangon for campaigning
national-wide protest (Ibid). Military junta responded
the protest by pouring armies to the street and took
oppressive action toward protesters. It is reported that
3,000 persons killed, 1,000 persons injured and
2,000 activists detained (Ibid). This tragedy is known
as 8-8-8 uprising.
To appease the conflict, government held national
election for choosing parliament members. In 1990,
NLD won the election. However, military junta
didn´t acknowledge the result and detained Aung San
Suu Kyi and many pro-democracy activists and took
over the government. Responding to power abuse by
military junta, European Union imposed first sanc-
tion to Myanmar by banning military export from EU
member states to Myanmar. In 1991, EU renewed her
previous sanction and added sanction including the
ban on military cooperation with Myanmar. These
policies were not binding to all EU member states.
However, in October 1996, EU for the first time was
agreed to make common position imposing visa ban
toward all Myanmar officials. They are not allowed to
visit all EU member states. In 2004, EU added
sanction including a ban on EU companies to invest
in Myanmar companies that are controlled by military
(Commission, 2013) and additional sanction is
imposed by EU in 2007 of import ban of wood, steel
and gem products from Myanmar.
In 2011, Myanmar government under Thein Sein
released Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest. In by-
election April 2012, Aung San Suu Kyi was elected as
parliament member. Thein Sein has adopted several
policies including legislation permitting trade union,
creation of Human Rights Commission,cease fire with
Karen ethic. Responding to the progress, the US and
the EU have lifted some sanction. Human rights
activists were questioning the policy because Myanmar
was not considered improving human rights regime
significantly.
In June 2012 communal conflict between
Rohingya and Rakhine ethic in Arakan province
erupted. Ten Rohingya men were allegedly dragged
from a bus in the western state of Rakhine and killed
by a mob of ethnic Rakhine in response to the rape
and killing of a Buddhist woman by three Rohingya
men(Zheng, 2012). Although the specific cause of this
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conflict between the Muslim Rohingya and the ethnic
Rakhine Buddhists is still unclear, this outbreak of
violence in and near Rakhine state’s capital city
of Sittwe, has resulted in the death of at least 50
people and more than 2,500 houses and religious
buildings set on fire, and more than 30,000 people
forced to flee their homes (Ibid).UN reported that
Rohingya people is the most persecuted minorities in
the world (AFP, 2012). Government is not considered
doing seriously in punishing the perpetrators and
drafting peace resolution.
In December 2012 Asian Correspondent (Linn,
2012) reported that Myanmar army has launched
comprehensive military operation against Katchin
Independence Army, a paramilitary body of Katchin
Independence Organization (KIO). According to
media reports, there are more than 30,000 internally
displaced persons (IDPs) in Burmese government
controlled areas and over 60,000 IDPs are currently
taking refuge in KIO controlled areas (Ibid). Several
hundreds of civilians continue to escape their native
places because they are scared of bullets, bombs,
forced labors, rape, torture and other forms of vio-
lence. This humanitarian crisis raised global concern
including from the United Nation, the EU and the
US.
RESEARCH QUESTION
Some research has been made to evaluate the
effectiveness of western states sanction to Myanmar.
There are 6 countries imposing sanction to Myanmar
up to date: the EU, the US, Canada, Japan, and
Australia. Kryvoi (2007) and Eriksson(2005) men-
tioned that the sanction is failed to achieve its objec-
tives due to significant influence by China, India,
Thailand and Singapore toward Myanmar economic
performances. Meanwhile Burma Campaign (2004
)mentioned that they are not serious in implementing
the sanction. It is reported that the sanction is not
targeting key sector of Myanmar economy. This article
attempted to explain the purpose of EU’s sanction on
Myanmar using normative power Europe theory. It
will look at the second purpose of EU’s sanction
which is the creation of EU’s identity as novel actor. It
will also discuss the implication of EU’s policy to
postpone sanction on normative power Europe
theory. Is the theory still relevant to explain EU
sanction policy toward Myanmar? This research is
using qualitative methodology with the method of
literature analysis by gathering reports and first and
secondary sources from official EU websites, online
news media and INGOs´ reports.
RESULT AND ANALYSIS
NORMATIVE POWER EUROPE (NPE)
Ian Manners´ (2002) seminal article of ¨Normative
Power Europe: Contradiction in Terms?¨has provoked
a lot of discussion in explaining EU foreign policy. In
2007, scholars at the European Union Studies
Association (EUSA) meeting voted Manners’ article
among the five most important, essential and seminal
academic pieces published over the previous ten years.
Manners’ concept of NPE became immensely
popular in EU studies, and was also adopted in policy
papers and public diplomacy. The self-identity of the
EU, as laid out in the EU Security Strategy in 2003,
is that it is a ‘force for good’. Key EU representatives,
such as European Commission President José Manuel
Barroso, have enthusiastically endorsed the concept of
NPE (Manners, 2008). Scholarly books and articles
that apply, refine and build on the concept and foster
a ‘trans disciplinary approach to European studies’
(Manner, 2009) are now proliferating (for example,
Tocci et al., 2008; Whitman, 2011), not to mention
the abundance of student essays and dissertations on
the theme.
The idea of NPE is actually a response to the
debate of EU´s international role. In 1990s, there was
a big question whether EU is military or civilian
power. 20 years after EU´s establishment, there was
traditional conception of EU´s international role as
civilian power which was long on economic power
and relatively short on armed forces. However it was
then questioned when in 1999 EU was creating
European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) and EU
committed to have 60,000 military personnel for
Verdinand Robertua
Normative Tensions: European Sanction vs. ASEAN’s Non-Interference in the Case of Myanmar
JURNAL HUBUNGAN INTERNASIONAL
VOL. 3 NO. 2 / OKTOBER 2014170
rapid reaction force (RRF) by the end 2003.
Manner criticized European scholars who are very
active debating whether EU is a civilian or military
power. He wrote:
One of the problems with the notions of civilian and
military power is their unhealthy concentration on how
much like a state the EU looks. The concept of normative
power is an attempt to refocus analysis away from
empirical emphasis on the EU´s institutions or policies,
and towards including cognitive processes, with both
substantive and symbolic components (Manners, 2000 in
Manners, 2002, p.239)
It was much said that NPE is on how the EU
wants to promote and achieve European norms, such
as human rights, climate preservation, and democracy.
EU is seen as a novel actor but Diez said that rather
than the zealous propagation of particular ‘European’
norms, it would be such a degree of reflexivity that
would make ‘normative power Europe’ stand out. He
explained:
¨Young’s contribution to the normative power debate
illustrates that ‘normative power’ is not an objective
category. Instead, it is a practice of discursive representa-
tion. From a discourse analytical point of view, the most
interesting question about normative power therefore is not
whether Europe is a normative power or not, but how it is
constructed as one.(Diez, 2005, p.626)
According to NPE, the politics of the EU is the
politics of creating or shaping the conception of the
normal. It means that the EU will create what-is-
normal in which the EU rivals are not in the circle of
the EU´s normal. For example, through series of
conference and negotiation, EU is consistently cam-
paigning climate change funds and emissions reduc-
tions in order to change the US behavior that is greed
for natural resources and world´s number one pol-
luter. It adapts to Thomas Diez´s postulation that EU
identity is constructed ‘against an image of others in
the “outside world” ’ (Diez, 2005, p. 614) and thus
depicts the process of identity formation as following
the logic of identity and difference, in which the role
of the ‘other’ is, in many case, played by the US.
Therefore, NPE also involved the politics of
othering – the self and the other. Diez establishes four
different modes of relationship between ‘self’ and
‘other’, according to the way the ‘other’ is represented
vis-à-vis the depiction of the ‘self’: the other could be
represented first, as an ‘existential threat’ (paradigm of
securitization); second, as ‘inferior’ (paradigm of
orientalism); third, as ‘violating universal principles’ (a
variation of the paradigm of orientalism); and finally,
as ‘different’ (refraining from making a value judge-
ment) (Diez, 2005, p. 628).
In the case of EU sanction to Myanmar, inferior
mode of relationship between the EU and Myanmar/
ASEAN is clearly seen from the EU’s declaration and
statement as well as bi-regional forum between
ASEAN and the EU in ASEM (Asia Europe Meeting.
The EU wants to shape the conception of the normal,
which is sanction and democracy shall be placed
toward Myanmar.
INFERIOR IN VALUES
The difference between Asian values and European
values is an interesting topic. Asian values as a concept
have been stressed by Southeast Asian leaders such as
the former Prime Ministers Mahathir Mohammad of
Malaysia, former President Soeharto of Indonesia and
Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore. The ‘founding father’ of
Singapore—Lee Kuan Yew has debated the differences
of values in the society between east and west
(Petersson, 2006). His argument is that in America
there are guns, drugs and violent crime. People do not
dare to go out in the middle of the night (Ibid). The
reason according to Lee is that humans have been
granted too many rights at the expense of the society.
Too much freedom, the argument goes, can disrupt
the development and lead to social conflict. Suharto
have either resisted the universality of Western con-
cepts of democracy, rights and law or suggested that
there are different non-liberal but equally valid under-
standings of these terms (Jones, 1997: 5–55 in
Mukherjee, 2010). In one speech, Former Myanmar
President Than Shwe blamed the West for using
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democracy and human rights as an excuse for other
intentions, arguing that Asian standards of democracy
cannot be the same as the Western standards
(Petersson, 2006). Other arguments from Asian leaders
are that economic growth is the most important
aspect of the society and growth will eventually lead to
democratic developments. East Asian politicians
argued that it was predominantly their Islamic-Confu-
cian cultural values that were acting as the driving
force behind Asia’s tremendous economic success
during the 1990s. Western arguments, on the other
hand, stress the importance of democracy as a base for
economic growth, and often discharge the Asian value
argument as a justification for suppressive behavior by
authoritarian governments.
The liberal foundations of the European project are
reflected in the political culture of the EU based on
democracy, rule of law, freedom of expression, some
form of free trade, transnational co-operation, and
shared normative framework finds its expression in the
acquis communautaire and in the admission of new
Member States. The presence of regional supranational
institutions and international non-governmental
organizations (INGOs), among others European Court
on Human Rights, European Court of Justice (ECJ),
European Parliament, and European Commission are
also main factors of establishing the EU as the stron-
gest human rights regime in the world.
Liberal values are also reflected in EU foreign
policy. There are five purpose of EU foreign policy
and one of them is ¨to develop and consolidate
democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human
rights and fundamental freedoms¨(Council,
2013).During 1990s, human rights, democracy, and
later governance became increasingly important
determinants in the European Union’s external
relations as a whole. It is presumed that ensuring
human rights protection and democracy in the non-
EU countries can help the EU to achieve stability and
peace in the European continent and in the world.
The most concrete examples are the EU’s policy in
enlargement and European Neighborhood Policy
(Hettne, Söderbaum and Stålgren, 2008, p.29-30).
The EU formulated a large number of specific
human rights and governance-related conditions and
criteria for its development assistance and trade
policies. The EU is the biggest aid donor in the world
which nearly three times US’ official development aid
(OECD, 2007). Since 1995, over twenty agreements
have been signed that contain the human rights clause
and applies to over 120 countries (Smith, 2003, pp.
111-112).
The EU also resorted to the application of sanc-
tions against countries that it deemed to have disre-
spected human rights, democracy or governance
norms. As seen in the below graphic, more than 50%
of the EU sanctions are related to human rights and
democracy.
Image 1. Factors of the EU sanctions on
Non-Members Period of 1981-2004.
Source: (Kreutz, 2005, p. 20)
NPE IN EU’S SANCTION ON MYANMAR
In the case of EU sanction to Myanmar, sanction is
the main strategy in constructing Normative Power
Europe. Human rights consideration is explicitly
mentioned in all European Council´s documents on
sanctions toward Myanmar. For example, in the
common position1996, it is written:
“… EU is concerned at the absense of progress towards
democratisation and at the continuing violation of
human rights in Burma/Myanmar. The European Union
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recalls its great concern at the failure of SLORC to respect
the results of the May 1990 elections and the sunsequent
maintenance of the military rule.”(Sipri, 1996)
Since 1996 to 2011, EU has continuously in-
creased the weight of sanctions. However, in 2012, the
EU has postponed all sanction, excluding arms
sanction.
NPE´S LIMITATION: POWER ASYMMETRIES
Power asymmetries are related to EU’s roles, power
and influence. Power imbalances are endemic between
parties involved in a conflict as well as between the
EU and one or both conflict parties. This asymmetry
in power relations in turn affects processes and any
desired outcomes that constructions of NPEU are
aimed at. EU normative power can be weakened if
other actors who have different values and norms have
bigger roles and influence to the target state.
In the wake of the May 2008 Cyclone Nargis, the
military regime was faced with a complex humanitar-
ian emergency. Initially the regime was reluctant to
grant access to international organizations and other
bodies (Cook, 2010). However, ASEAN was able to
facilitate greater access for international humanitarian
agencies to those affected by the natural disaster
through the Tripartite Core Group (TCG), an
ASEAN-led mechanism. The TCG was formed after
the May 2008 special ASEAN meeting in Singapore
and the UN-ASEAN pledging conference in Yangon to
Table1.Summary of EU Sanction to Myanmar1996-2012
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‘facilitate trust, confidence and cooperation between
Myanmar and the international community (Ibid). The
TCG offered a mechanism through which visas were
quickly processed for UN officials and foreign aid
workers; it assisted the entry and deployment of WFP
helicopters; and facilitated the collection of data from
affected areas. Meanwhile, the EU can hardly engage
with Myanmar in Cylone Nargis. As the leading
international actor in emergency disaster aid, EU was
eager to channel substantial aid to Myanmar. However,
the initial response of the military regime in Myanmar
was to block and delay the EU aid (Abramowitz &
Pickering, 2008). As a result of EU hegemony toward
Myanmar, the exclusion of humanitarian assistance
highlights a way that the EU can assist those affected
by the Cyclone.
Table 2. Myanmar Trading Partner in 2011
Source: (Factbook, 2013)
The EU is hardly influence Myanmar due to its
lack of economic importance on Myanmar. As seen in
table 2, ASEAN, China and India are top three
important trading partners. Eriksson (2005) stated
that there would be more information available which
could decrease the likelihood of the target getting
circumventing the EU sanctions. Kryvoi (2007) stated
that Myanmar have a powerful non-Western “older
brother”, who turns a blind eye to violations of labor
rights and human rights violations in general and
provide economic support. China is the key trade,
investment and political partner of Myanmar.For
instance the Burmese ambassador to London has once
said that “we are not worried about US and European
sanctions, as trade with India, China and Thailand is
already good”(News, 2003).
NPE LIMITATION: CONFLICTING WITH MEMBER STATES
INTEREST
So many times EU policies don´t reflect EU´s
norms and values. Political lobbying and economic
considerations of member states has created obstacles
in the implementation of normative power Europe.
Indeed conflicting with member states interestis
unavoidable due to different interest between each EU
member states.
In EU sanction toward Myanmar, France is a
country who has conflict of interest in the EU policy.
The main factor of French resistance is that French
Total Oil has large investment in Myanmar. Burma
Campaign UK has published a report that Total Oil
has successfully lobbied French government to per-
suade Myanmar government to secure their business
objective in Myanmar (Burma Campaign, 2005).Total
Oil is EU biggest investor in Myanmar and has large
concession for gas exploitation and exploration which
located in Yadana project. Burma Campaign UK
reported that Yadana project has produced incomes
for military junta amounted 450 million US Dollar
every year (Ibid). Not only Yadana, Total Oil also got
concession for gas exploitation in Sein with
contruction cost amounted 40 million US Dollar.
Burma Campaign UK reported some evidences that
Total Oil has lobbied French government to secure
their business worldwide:
1. Total Oil received strong political support from
Chirac regime. Former French President Jacques
Chirac and Former Total Oil CEO Thierry
Desmarest have been travel companions on numer-
ous official foreign trips since the mid-1990s. They
have travelled together to Algeria(2003) and
Libya(2004). In June 2004, Chirac awarded
Thierry Desmarest one of France’s highest acco-
lades, the Legion of Honour, for distinguished
service to France.
2. French government has defended Total Oil in many
lawsuits toward Total Oil in many courts of
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countries including Belgium, France and United
States of America. In one of hearing in the US
court, French government mentioned:
“respect fullyo bjects to the exercise of personal jurisdiction
by this court over, a corporate citizen of France, on the
ground that it would conflict with the sovereignty and
laws of France. Maintenance of this action against in the
United States courts will conflict with France’s foreign
policy interests”. (Ibid)
In the case of EU sanction toward Myanmar,
French government has declared its position to against
full ban toward Myanmar. Burma Campaign UK has
published on how French diplomat has protected
Total Oil from investment sanction toward Myanmar
in 2004. In October 2004, European Union has
considered to impose targeted sanction to European
companies in Myanmar. International NGOs urged
EU to take this sanction because previous sanction has
not been effective to change Myanmar and conse-
quently, this sanction will have significant impact to
Total Oil operation. Chirac expressed his concern that
EU sanction should not endanger European compa-
nies’ activities in Myanmar including Total Oil. BBC
International has published his comment:
“… French President Jacques Chirac seemed to cast doubt
on their effectiveness, saying he hoped the EU’s sanctions
policy would not damage the operations of the French oil
firm, which has large investments in Burma.” (Ibid)
After intensive lobbying, the sanction plan is being
revised. EU imposed sanction to European companies
not to give loan to Myanmar companies.
NPE IN ACTION: THE EU, ASEAN AND MYANMAR
Despite its limitation as explained above, NPE is
still valid. Without showing much flexibility, the EU
maintained its tough stance against Burma, and
wanted to exclude Burma’s participation in the ASEM
(Asia–Europe Meeting). ASEAN resisted for applying
hard stances on Myanmar and prefer giving statement
on Myanmar issue. The EU strongly opposed
Myanmar’s entry into the ASEAN and refused to have
a dialogue in ASEM in the presence of officials from
the military junta. ASEAN on other hand defended
its new member, arguing that the ASEM process
should continue to follow the norms of ASEAN and
the ARF (Asia Regional Forum). European and Asian
foreign ministers had agreed on this approach only
months before Myanmar’s entry. The Joint Declara-
tion of the 12th ASEAN–EU Ministerial Meeting in
Singapore in 1997 stressed that security cooperation
should be deepen in issues of common concern and
that the dialogue should not stop because of differ-
ences in certain areas (Cook, 2010).
This hostility created inability to reach an agree-
ment and led to the cancellation of the Joint Coopera-
tion Committee meeting in 1997. The ASEM II
meeting in London 1998 following the economic
crisis was met with great controversy. Since the UK
did not grant any visas for Myanmar officials, they
were automatically left out from the meeting. ASEAN
threatened with a complete boycott. The EU was
putting a strong point on ASEM being more than just
economics, and that political sensitivities had to be
dealt with on a ministerial level. The attempt to
exclude Myanmar failed and even if officials from the
military junta did not attend the meeting, it was
agreed on that the ASEM process would be an infor-
mal forum where all participants will have equal
status. In a very diplomatic statement by the Chair-
man for the ASEM II meeting, it was declared that
ASEM do not need to be further institutionalized and
is an informal process.
In order “not to let the issue of Burma/Myanmar
hold the ASEAN–EU dialogue hostage” (a criticism
raised against Europe by ASEAN members desperately
in need of support after the 1997 crisis), the first
Foreign Ministers’ Meeting with Burmese representa-
tives was held in Vientiane in December 2000. How-
ever several EU members sent only a low-level delega-
tion. A “diplomatically correct” declaration was made
but Burma was still denied access to the 1980
ASEAN–EU Economic Cooperation Agreement, thus
refusing Rangoon access to any developmental
programmes.
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Since then, the problem and deadlock in the
ASEM process were consistent in the ASEAN–EU
relationship. In the absence of goodwill from the
junta and with an EU affixed to its prerequisites, two
ASEM ministerial meetings were cancelled (July and
September 2004). During the ASEM Foreign Minis-
ters Meeting in Ireland to discuss the enlargement of
the ASEM process in 2004, the EU reiterated its
stances by lying down conditions calling for the release
of Aung San Suu Kyi, free participation of the Na-
tional League for Democracy and other elected repre-
sentatives in the National Convention, etc, in return
for Burma’s participation in the ASEM process
(Rocher, 2012).
Obviously, Burma remained a contentious issue
and, as a continuing irritant, it became a stumbling
block to inter-regional cooperation. Human rights
issue in Myanmar is the main obstacles of the creation
of EU-ASEAN Free Trade Area. Southeast Asian
countries have been remarkably successful in penetrat-
ing EU markets and in diversifying the composition of
their exports to the EU. By the end of the century,
ASEAN trade with the EU exceeded that of the 70
ACP (Africa, Carribean, and Pacific) countries
(Kettunen, 2004). In the 15-year period immediately
preceding the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the EU
enjoyed a trade surplus with ASEAN in only two
years, which are 1985 and 1995 (Commission, 2006).
In 1998, ASEAN’s surplus was multiplied by nearly
ten times from its level in 1997. By 2005, EU exports
to ASEAN amounted to EUR44.888 billion, but its
imports from ASEAN totaled EUR70.520 billion
leaving a trade deficit of EUR25.632 billion. The
average deficit from 2001 to 2005 was EUR25 billion
(Centre, 2006). Hence, when in 2002–2003, several
ASEAN membersrequested FTA negotiations and the
European Commission refused the proposals. The
European Commission claims that economic criteria,
such as market potential and protection against EU
export interests, are not the only criteria for selecting
FTA partners. Political criteria – the human rights
record and democratic credentials – are also allegedly
taken into account(Robles, 2008).
As was to be expected, ASEAN, which has stead-
fastly refused to take action against Myanmar, was
reported as insisting on region-to-region negotiations
as a means of enhancing ASEAN’s bargaining power.
The alternatives to the ASEAN’s position would have
entailed either negotiating with individual ASEAN
members, which would have been unacceptable to
ASEAN, or not entering into an FTA, which would
have been unacceptable to both (Nation, 2007).
In July 2006, the EU’s Trade Counselor in Thai-
land admitted that political reform in Myanmar was
the main issue that the EU had to consider as it
decided whether to proceed to FTA negotiations
(Nation, 2006). A year later, the EU apparently agreed
to the ASEAN format: in May 2007, the EU’s Trade
Commissioner, while insisting that the EU position
on Myanmar had not changed, agreed to initiate FTA
negotiations with ASEAN, without excluding
Myanmar (Bernama.com, 2007). Bloody monk protest
in Myanmar in September 2007 changed the whole
direction of the EU-ASEAN FTA. The European
Parliament, the European Council and European
NGOs to the EU were to impose new sanctions and
stop FTA talks.
The September 2007 crackdown against monks –
the so-called Saffron Revolution - was unsurprisingly
followed by strong condemnation by the EU and the
international community. The resolution adopted by
the European Parliament (Parliament, 2007) “ap-
plauded the courageous action of the Burmese monks
and tens of thousands of other peaceful demonstrators
in confronting the antidemocratic and repressive
regime and utterly condemned the brutal response by
the Burmese authorities.” The European Parliament
“expressed its horror at the killing of peaceful protest-
ors, insisted that the security forces return to barracks
and called for recognition of the legitimacy of the
demands” (Ibid) being made as well as for the release of
arrested demonstrators and other political prisoners,
including Aung San Suu Kyi. It approved a brief but
far-reaching list of demands, some directed at the
Burmese government but others aimed at the interna-
tional community, including China. These were the
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first targeted sanctions that would actually have an
impact on the regime and its cronies. “In view of the
seriousness of the current situation and in solidarity
with the people of Burma/Myanmar, the EU deems it
necessary to increase direct pressure on the regime
through stronger measures” (Council, 2007) declared
the Foreign Ministers in a joint statement.
In response, ASEAN member states sent request to
Myanmar by using the strongest use of language since
Myanmar joined ASEAN. ASEAN member states
clearly and strongly expressed outrage at Myanmar’s
violent repression. Indonesia called on Myanmar to
“exercise maximum restraint and desist from any acts
that could cause further violence” (Kittisereechai,
2008). Singapore’s Foreign Minister, George Yeo,
acting as Chair of ASEAN, in a formal statement
expressed the collective “revulsion” to Myanmar
Foreign Minister Nyan Win (Yeo, 2007). In April
2008, the European Parliament called on the govern-
ments of the EU to consider more targeted sanctions,
such as a comprehensive ban on new investments and
an embargo on trade in key commodities that pro-
vided significant revenue to the military government.
Furthermore, it urged the EU to campaign for a
worldwide arms embargo on Burma.
Evidence for internal division onASEAN’s position
over Myanmar issue is seen in the ASEAN’s split
decision in 2005 to deny Myanmar the chair of the
organization. The chairmanship of ASEAN is alpha-
betically rotated, and the Philippines will take the
place of Burma, which is listed under the name of
Myanmar. The Thai Foreign Minister Kantathi
Suphamongkohn was clearthat “we [ASEAN] had
been informed by our colleague. Foreign Minister U
Nyan Win of Myanmar, that the Government of
Myanmar had decidedto relinquish its turn to be the
Chair of ASEAN in 2006 because it wanted to focus
its attention on the on-going national reconciliation
and démocratisation process” (Osman, 2005). How-
ever it is reported that there have been divisions over
the issue within the 10-member ASEAN body itself.
Burma’s loyal supporters are mainly the newer mem-
bers of the group - Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam. But
Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia and Singapore
had urged ASEAN to break with their stance of non-
interference and send a message to Rangoon that it
must begin the real work of democratic reform(News,
2005). In the end, they shared Burmese view.
MYANMAR´S REFORM: IS IT SUSTAINABLE AND IRRE-
VERSIBLE?
After the adoption of a new constitution in 2008,
an election was called on 7 November 2010. These
general elections constituted the fifth step on a seven-
step roadmap to democracy. They resulted in a victory
for the military-backed “Union Solidarity and Devel-
opment Party” and a new government at the end of
March 2011.
Despite Western scepticism of Burma’s first poll in
20 years (most of the leaders of European countries
have responded to the result of the elections with
condemnation, regarding them as not free and fair),
ASEAN welcomed November’s “conducive and
transparent” election as it has supported the slow
transition in a perseverant, yet discreet manner
(Haacke, 2008). For the first time, ethnic minorities
have a legal framework, allowing them to be repre-
sented in Parliament. Echoing a joint declaration by
major ethnic political parties, ASEAN called for the
lifting of sanctions enforced by the United States and
European countries.
In November 2010, 1 week after the contest, Aung
San Suu Kyi was released and, in the following
months, met different ministers. Surin Pitsuwan,
Former Secretary General of ASEAN, welcomed the
“reconciliation gesture”. Later, taking advantage of the
reform process (amendments to the party registration
law of 2010), NLD senior leaders decided to register as
a new political party, which means that they can field
candidates for the next election, including Aung San
Suu Kyi herself.
On 30 March, Than Shwe resigned from his
position as Head of State and Thein Sein became the
president of Burma. A dialogue between the govern-
ment and Aung San Suu Kyi was initiated when she
was invited to Naypyidaw by the new president.
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In November 2011, when she met with representa-
tives from the EU, Aung San Suu Kyi pleaded for a
visit byWunna Maung Lwin, the current Burmese
Foreign Minister to Brussels (the minister had already
gone to Washington and received Secretary of State
Clinton in December 2011). And at the ASEAN Bali
Summit of November 2011, Burma was approved to
chair the Association in 2014. David Lipman, the
EU’s Bangkok-based ambassador to Myanmar stated
that responding to drastic change in Myanmar, the EU
will review EU’s policy on Myanmar (Robinson,
2012). In April 2012, the EU has postponed all
sanction except arms embargo.
However, NGOs and ethic activists are against EU’s
decision to postpone the sanction. There are some
reports showing government failure in implementing
its promise and even harming Burmese society through
negligence on sectarian violence and arms attack.
Regarding media freedom, Paris-based press organi-
zation Reporters Without Borders have reported that
media reform has not been effectively implemented as
promised. On August 20, 2012 the government
announced the end of prior censorship for all of
Burma’s weeklies, ending a 48-year-old practice.
However, most journalists say this has not meant a
radical change in their activities(Ismaïl, 2012). Some
claimed that they have not seen any radical evolution
in the content of the weeklies since the lifting of prior
censorship. Myanmar Independent editor Ma Thida said
some reporters pay more attention now to what they
write than during “the era,” a term often used in
interviews to refer to the period when prior censor-
ship was in force, suggesting that, although recent,
journalists regard it as a thing of the past (Ibid, p.17).
“Before, we could write what we wanted and we
waited to see if it would obtain the PSRD’s (Ministry
of Information’s Press Scrutiny and Registration
Division) approval but now we must go to press
knowing that if we cross the line, we will pay the
consequences,” Ma Thida added (Ibid, p.17). Since the
abolition of prior censorship, journalists have being
paying much more attention to the content they
publish or have been censoring themselves for fear of
government reprisals. The editors of non-political
publications, the first to benefit from the lifting of
censorship, were the first to note this and it has been
repeatedly confirmed since the start of the year.
At least four lawsuits were brought against pri-
vately-owned weeklies from January to August 2012,
mostly by government officials (Ibid, p.17). Modern
Weekly and one of its reporters, Thet Su Aung, were
sued construction ministry engineer in January over a
November 2011 article about the poor condition of a
road in the Mandalay area. A March 2012 article in
The Voice about alleged corruption within the govern-
ment elicited a libel suit from the ministry of mines
on 20 September 2012, a month after the end of
censorship.
Although it no longer screens content before
publication, the PSRD still has an effective mechanism
for pressuring the print media. As it registers newspa-
pers and controls publication licences, it can suspend
a newspaper whenever it likes for publishing “forbid-
den” content. Just two weeks before censorship was
lifted, two weeklies, The Envoy and The Voice, were
suspended indefinitely for “violating 2011 Order No.
44” and for “contravening PSRD regulations,” namely,
publishing articles that had not received prior ap-
proval (Ibid, p.19).
Despite of Thein Sein’s commitment for cease fire
with ethnic minorities, Myanmar army has not
stopped attacking ethnic minorities including
Rohingya and Kachin. In July 2010, there was an
outrage in Arakan states that resulted to five death and
thousands of people flee to Thailand and other
ASEAN country. Human Rights Watch reported that
there is negligence of government toward this sectarian
conflict and not protecting the minorities. Drawing
on 57 interviews conducted in Burma and Bangladesh
with Arakan, Rohingya, and others, this report
describes the initial events, the acts of violence that
followed by both Arakan and Rohingya, and the role
of state security forces in both failing to intervene to
stop sectarian violence and directly participating in
abuses (Watch, 2012). It examines the discriminatory
forced relocations of Rohingya by the Burmese govern-
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ment from an Arakan population that feels long
ignored.
Witness after witness described to Human Rights
Watch how the Burmese authorities failed to provide
protection to either side in the early days of the
violence and that Arakan and local security forces
colluded in acts of arson and violence against
Rohingya in Sittwe and in the predominantly Muslim
townships of northern Arakan State (Ibid).
Not only with Rohingya, Myanmar army also took
offensive action against Katchin ethnic. Media (Fuller,
2012; Linn, 2012) has reported that since December
2012, Myanmar army has executed comprehensive
military operation against Katchin Independence
Army, a paramilitary body of Katchin Independence
Organization (KIO). It was estimated that there are
more than 30,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs)
in Burmese government controlled areas and over
60,000 IDPs are currently taking refuge in KIO
controlled areas (Linn, 2012). Several hundreds of
civilians continue to escape their native places because
they are scared of bullets, bombs, forced labors, rape,
torture and other forms of violence. This is not the
first case of army attack. Human Rights Watch has
reported that the Burmese government has committed
serious abuses and blocked humanitarian aid to tens
of thousands of displaced civilians since June 2011, in
fighting in Burma’snorthern Kachin State (Watch,
2012). The 83-page report, “‘Untold Miseries’: War-
time Abuses and Forced Displacement in Burma’s
Kachin State,” describes how the Burmese army has
attacked Kachin villages, razed homes, pillaged proper-
ties, and forced the displacement of tens of thousands
of people. Soldiers have threatened and tortured
civilians during interrogations and raped women.
Thearmy has also used antipersonnel mines and
conscripted forced laborers, including children as
young as 14, on the front lines. If there is no immedi-
ate action done by current regime, the humanitarian
crisis will be escalated to unprecedented level.
The lifting of sanctions on Burma delegitimizes
ethnic nationalities’ demands for a cessation of
hostilities in Kachin state, and prematurely rewards
the Burmese regime while the military undertakes a
clear escalation of violence. The absence of sanctions
removes the motivation for the government to engage
in further and serious negotiations with ethnic groups
as well as political reform leading towards the 2015
election. The removal of sanctions condones the
violence, exacerbates the conflict, destabilizes the
negotiations, and sets back the peace process.
CONCLUSION
This research concluded that, before the sanction is
lifted out, the EU successfully projects of itself in the
international arena. Through sanction, EU managed
to export what the EU is. Although there is inconsis-
tency between internal and external planes, EU is
considered as novel actor that campaign for ‘utopian
normativity’ (Nicolaidis & Howse, 2002, p. 789) and
the ‘missionary zeal’ (Diez, 2005, p. 623). EU sanc-
tion is symbolic action picturing EU’s identity as
human rights champion, compare to ASEAN who
adopted a more flexible and friendly policy. However,
in the beginning of 2012, NPE become obsolete. The
hegemony of sanction policy is being challenged and
EU instead surrenders to the concept of constructive
engagement, a ‘normal’ strategy defined by ASEAN.
For further research, it can be explained on factors
of EU’s policy to postpone the sanction. There are
arguments from economists stating that EU can’t lose
the Myanmar business opportunities. Barrack Obama,
the first sitting US president visited Myanmar, has
lifted out the sanction and invited some US compa-
nies to invest in Myanmar. The Euro crisis and slowing
global economy can also be consideration for the EU
to postpone the sanction. It is also important to look
at the continuation of the EU-ASEAN FTA negotia-
tion.
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